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stated by the appellant~. this is essentially an
artion for conversion of personal property located in a
drive-in cafe and for resulting damages, which action
1
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was brought by the plaintiffs as the operators and lessees
of a drive-in cafe against the defendants as the owners
of the cafe premises. The defendants counterclaimed for
unpaid lease rentals and damages for breach of the lease.

DISP·OSITION IN L·OWER COURT
The case was tried to the court. From a verdict and
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs the defendants have
appealed.

RELIEF SOUGHT BY DEFENDANTS ON APPEAL
Defendants-Appellants seek reversal of the entire
judgment of the lower court and an award to the defendants in the amount of $1,250 on the defendants' counterclaim.

IDEN·TIFI,CATION OF T·HE PARTIES AND
EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS
Richard N. Peterson and Maxine H. p·eterson, his
wife, are the plaintiffs and respondents. J. Lowell Platt
and Joseph W. Beesley are the defendants and appellants. For practical purposes Richard N. Peterson is
referred to by his own name or as the plaintiff and J.
Lowell Platt is referred to by his own name or as the
defendant, both references being in the singular. When
2
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~J axine

I I. Peterson is referred to she is mentioned as
up}nintiff's \Vife'' although in fact she is a party plaintiff.
,Joseph W. Beesley is not referred to at all in this brief.
'rhP foregoing is consistent with the appellant's identifi<'n.tion of thP parties.
UT. ______ " refers to a page reference in the transcript
of the trial proceedings. "R. ______ , refers to a page referencP in tlH' record of the case.

RESPOND·ENT'S' STATE·MENT OF FACTS
The defendant-appellant's statement of facts purporting to be "an honest and fair extract of the record"
hardly satisfies that expectation, and hence the plaintiffsrespondents have chosen to restate the facts as thought
to be pertinent herein. No attempt will be made to
delineate the misstatements and improper inferences contained in the defendant-appellant's statement. A glaring
example of a misstatement of the record which could
only be calculated to arouse some suspicion of collusion
is counsel's state1nent on page 10 of the defendant-appellant's brief that "plaintiff's wife was related to members
of the Edwards family that controls the closely-held
Arctic Circle corporation." A glance at the record ( T.
436, 457) reveals the true fact that the plaintiff's wife
has no relationship whatsoever to members of the Edw·ards family. This fact seems unimportant, but the
misstatement of the record is hardly consistent with the
defendant-appellant's assertion that the factual presenta-

3
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tion would be "honest and fair" and sets thP tone of his
entire statement.
During the 1nonth of August, 1960 the plaintiff,
Peterson, entPred into a lease \vith the defendants \vher(
hy Peterson and his \\'ifP undertook to lease a drive-in
cafe and premises from the defendants (Exhibit 1).
Occupancy \Vas to have commenced August 10, 1960 (T.
11). Because of a delay in getting the\ building ready, the
plaintiffs \Yere not able to occupy the premises until
August 23, 1960 (T. 1±).
1

-

On June 10, 1960 the plaintiffs paid an advance
rental of $1,250 (Exhibit 1, T. 20). By reason of the
delay to August 23, 1960, in getting in the property, the
commencement of the monthly rental period was changed
from the lOth day of each month to the 23rd (T .18).
The business, not unlike other similar businesses, experienced some difficulty. The drive-in, however, by the
summer of 1962 \vas making sufficient to pay the overhead, rental and utility payments (T. 36). Its 'vorking
capital, however, was beiilg depleted (T. 36). Nevertheless, by August 14, 1962, the business had reached the
"break-even point" (T. 35, 248, 392). It was Peterson's
desire to eventually sell the business 'vhich was estimated to have a value at that time of $36,000 (T. 445,
520).
4
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()n th(• 1:1th of ..:\ug·u~t, UH;~, P(~terson and Platt had
a <·onvPr~ation in regard to thP drivf'-in operation (T.
35). Hy that ti1ne Peterson had missed a total of two
ntonth~ rent for prior n1onths, hut had paid the current
tnonthly rPntal (T. 17-30, 2~9, I~~xhibit :2). Peterson told
l,lat t. that hP understood that Platt \\·as getting ready to
huild an offie(• building and that Platt ought to kno'v at
,,·hat point thP drive-in 'vas (T. 3;)); that the drive-in was
finall~· at the break-even point (T. 35): and that he 'vas
intf'r(•stf'd in ~<'lling thP drive-in (T. 35). Peterson
thought that l~latt, as the o'vner of the property, might
hP intPrestPd in buying the drive-in (T. 36). Peterson
a~~nred Platt t hn t in any event the rent would continue
to be paid (T. B7, 238, 240).
That same night or early the next morning of August
14, 1962, defendant Platt, without any notice or warning

to the plaintiffs 'vhatsoever and without authority of the
plaintiffs, 'vent to the drive-in premises, changed the lock
on

tlu~

building, parked his camper in front of the door

and dPnied plaintiffs access to the drive-in and thus
"took over" the premises ('T. 38-44). On being notified
of the defendant's action, the plaintiff, Richard N. P'eterson. "·ent to the premises and requested Platt to open
the doors and get the business open and then sit down
and iron out 'vhat differences there were (T. 39-44). This
Platt defiantly refused to do ( T. 40-45). Particularly did
Peterson request that he be given the perishables and his
5
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bookkeeping and payroll records, all of which was again
refused by Platt in an arrogant and defiant manner (T.
40-41). Defendant Platt would not even let P'eterson have
access to the telephone in the premises to call the employees and advise them not to come to work.
At the time of the lock-out and take-over by the
defendant, J. Lowell Platt, the following items of property were within the premises (T. 93) :
(A) Equipment being purchased by the Petersons from Arctic Circle, Inc., under a conditional
sales contract (Exhibit 6).
(B) Equipment (Exhibit 7) not covered by the
conditional sales contract.
(C') · Other items of personal property (Ex-

hibit 7), and
(D)

Inventory (Exhibit 7).

'The plaintiff later the same day contacted representatives of the Arctic ~Circle organization and consulted
with their legal counsel regarding the situation (T. 411,
430, 431). Inasmuch as Peterson was indebted to Arctic
Circle on an open account in addition to his indebtedness
under the conditional sales contract covering certain
equipment in the drive-in, a "security" arrangement was
6
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~ntPr(ld

into (Exhibit 5, T. 411, 430, 431), pursuant to
,,·hich rPpresentatives of Arctie Circle made a demand
on Platt the afternoon of August 14th to unlock the
building so that they could get in, take inventory and
rPnlove thPir equipntPnt (T. 50-53). Platt again refused

to let anyonP Pnter the drive-in stating that nobody was
gPtting into that building 'Yithout a court order (T. 53).
ThPreafter both Arctic Circle and the Petersons comtnenced separate actions against Platt for the conversion
of their respective property interests and such damages
as each had sustained by reason of Platt's conduct.
Arctic Circle eventually settled its claim against
Platt and in so doing it was expressly agreed that the
clain1 of the Petersons was not being affected (Exhibits
5-D and 1~). Peterson, in his action, was seeking (a)
damages for the conversion of his interest in the equiptnent being purchased under the conditional sales contract from .A. rctic 'Circle; (b) damages for the conversion
of other personal property and inventory; (c) damages
for the destruction of his business; (d) damages for
mental anguish; and (e) punitive damages (R. 1-3,
79-80).
The trial court filed a Memorandum Decision (R.
84-85) and made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

7
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Law (R. 88-92). Counsel for thP appP llant, on pages -!
through 9 of his brief has quoted in full the Findings of
Fact made by the trial court. The trial court entered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (R. 97-98, also quoted
on page 2 of appellant's brief), from 'vhich judgment the
defendant Platt has appealed.

SCO·P·E OF R.EVIEW
Counsel for the defendant seems to have misconceived the scope of review. His argument on appeal is
essentially the same argument that was made to the trial
court. He states on page 3 of the appellant's brief, "The
facts, rather than the law, will determine this appeal,
although the trial judge committed error of both law and
fact." This case, of course, is an action at law and, therefore, it follows that this appeal is upon questions of law
alone. In other words, this court is not to now pass upon
the weight of the evidence nor to determine conflicts
therein, but to examine the evidence solely for the purpose of determining whether or not the judgment finds
substantial support in the evidence. This principle is so
well established that normally it "\vould only receive passing comment, but in view of the approach taken by counsel for the appellant, the language of this court in the
case of Sine v. Salt Lake Transp. Co., 106 U. 289, 147
P.2d 875, 878 is cited:
"'This is a case at law. It therefore follo,vs
that this appeal is upon questions of law alone.
That being true the function of this court is not
to pass upon the weight of the evidence, nor to

8
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dt'tPrtnine eonfli<'ts thPf('in. hut to Pxrunine it solely for thP purposes of detPrlnining "·hPthPr or not
tlH' judginPnt finds substantial support in the
t'vidPneP. In so ('Xamining tlH' evidence all reasonahlP prPsumptions are in favor of the trial
eourt's findings and judgment, and the evidence
n1ust hP considPred in thP light most favorablP to
thent. If the findings and judgment are substantiall~" supported h~. the evidence, then the court
ntay not disturb the1n. When, however, the evidPneP is viP\\'"Pd in the light most favorable to the
judgtnent of the trial court, the conclusion to be
drawn therefrom is a matter of law, and the question \\"hich confronts this court is whether or not
the court on the basis of such facts ""as correct
in its conclusions of law."
AR.Gl1l\[ENT
POINT NO. I
THERE WAS A CONVERSION BY PLATT OF PETERSON'S PROPERTY AND THE FINDINGS O·F THE TRIAL
COURT IN REGARD THERETO ARE AMPLY SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.

Findings of Fact Nos. 6, 7~ 8, 9 and 10 are the Findings that bear on thP conversion. As will be sho,vn, they
are supported by substantial evidence.
(~\)

The connnencenu:nf of the monthly rental
period u·as cha.ngrd fronl the lOth to the 23r.d of each
n1.onth.
There is no question that the trial court ""as justified
in finding that the commencement of the monthly rental
9
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period "\vas changed from the lOth to the 23rd of the
month (Finding No. 5, R. 89). Peterson so testified (T.
18, 19). Counsel for the defendant even admits the same
on page 11 of his brief. The history of the handling of
the rental payments is set forth on pages 17-31 of the
transcript and evidenced by Peterson's cancelled checks
and vouchers, Exhibit 2.
(B)

On August 14, 1962, the day of the lock-out

and take-over by Platt, the rental was actually paid to
August 23rd.

The evidence clearly supports the finding (No.6, R.
89) that on August 14, 1962, the day of the lock-out, the
rental was actually paid to August 23, 1962 (Exhibit 2,
T. 17-30). It is true that there were two prior months
for which the rental had not been paid (Finding No.6, R.
89), but, nevertheless, the current month's rental was
paid. These facts find substantial support in the record
(T. 25-31, Exhibit 2). Peterson's cancelled check of July

23, 19:62 (see Exhibit 2) and Peterson's testimony (T.
25-31) evidence the fact that the payment made to Pla.tt
on July 23, 1962 was for the period front July 23, 1962
to August 22, 1962. Thus on August 14, 1962, the day of

the "lock-out," the rental "\\ as in fact paid to August
7

23rd. Counsel for Platt in Point No. IV of his brief
argues as he did to the trial court, that Peterson had not
10
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pn.irl t hP currPnt Inonth 's rent at the tin1e of the lock-out,
hut that paynu~nts 'vere being credited to earlier months'
n·ntnl. 'Phe trial court, howPver, chose to believe the
tPRtintony of I>etPrson, as supported by his cancelled
chPeks, that \vhile PetPrson o\vPd rental for two prior
rnonths, hP ,\~as neverthelPss 1naking payments for currc·nt n~ntal, and thPy were being received as such, at the
titne of the lock-out, and payments made for the months
irninedjately prior thereto were made for the then current
tnonths (T. 25-31, Exhibit 2).
Tt isn't a question of '\vhether the payments made by
PPterson had to be applied to current months' rental
rather than to the two prior months for 'vhich rental was
still owing, but the issue was what the parties were
actually doing .
.A.s a matter of fact on August 13, 1962, the day
before the lock-out and take-over, Peterson had assured
Platt that the rent would continue to be paid (T. 37).
(C) The defendant never made any demand for
the pa.ynzcnt of rent or gave notice of any default, etc.

The court was justified in finding (Finding No.7, R.
89) that during the period of tilne that the plaintiffs
occupied the drive-in property, that the defendant never
at any time made any demands on the plaintiffs for the
payment of delinquent rental, nor was any notice ever
given of any default on the part of the plaintiffs in the
performance of the lease or of any intention on the part
11
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of the defendant to terminate the plaintiffs' occupancy
of the premises (T. 33, 683-684).
(D)

The lock-out, take-over and converszon by

Platt.
There is substantial evidence sho\ving that on August
14, 1962, in the night time or early 1norning, the defendant Platt, ·w·ithout notice or warning to plaintiffs whatsoever, \vent to the drive-in premises, changed the locks
on the building, and parked his campPr in front of the
door ( T. 38-45, 50-52, 685).
Peterson's testimony was that on arriving at the
drive-in he pleaded with Platt to get the business open
and then sit do\vn and 'vork out the problem (T. 40).
This Platt refused to do ('T. 40). P'eterson then requested
that he be let in to save the "perishables" ( T. 40). He
was refused ( T. 40). Peterson then asked to get his
books and payroll and was again denied access to the
property ( T. -11, 42). Peterson was not even permitted
to go inside to make a telephone call to advise ''the help"
not to come to \Vork (T. 43). Platt testified on crossexamination that even if Peterson had made a demand
for the equipment and property, it would not have been
given to him ('T. 686, 687). Platt stated that no one was
going into that building ( T. 40, 41). The evidence thus
a1nply supports Finding of Fact No. 8 (R. 89-90) and
justifies ,c ·o nclusions of La\v Nos. 1 and 2 (R. 91-92),
which conclusions are as follows:
12
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''1. J)pf~'ndant, 1)latt. had no right to Pnter
thP drivP-in Jn·•·rnises and deny thP Petersons aec-Pss therPto. Jl is con(lnet a1nounted to a forcihlP
entry as dPfined by Chapter 3() of Title 7S, lTtah
Code ..:\nnotatPd, 1953.
By his eonduet thP def('ndant, Platt, unla\vfully tPnninated the LeasP, relieved the l)•·tersons of an~~ furthPr obligation to pay rent, n1ade
hitnsPlf ohligat<'d for damages reasonably flowing
frotn his tortious act; eonvertPd J>Pterson's property within the premises, and made himself obligated for damages allowable as an action of trover
for such conversion."
H•>

There is no question that this conduct on the part
of Platt amounted to a conversion of the property in thP
pretnises. Neither is thPrP any doubt that there was not
only a eonversion as to Peterson as a conditional vendee,
hut certainly if not before, then at least by the afternoon
of . -\.ugust 14, 1962, by reason of the assignment to Arctic
Cirele (Exhibit 5-A), there "Tas a conversion as to Arctie
Circh'.
ThP faC't that the defPndant called the plaintiff's
residence at about 8:30 . A.. l\L on the morning of the 14th
and talked to the plaintiff's wife advising her that he
had decided to "enforce clause 8 of our contract," to
"~hich the plaintiff's "~ife replied, '' ... that is wonderful"
( 1,. 655, page 19 of defendant's brief), can be of little
help to the defendant. It is obvious that rather than giving consent to a lock-out and termination of the plaintiff's
13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

business, the expression of the plaintiff's \Yife -

if she

in fact said \vhat the defendant clai1ns she said -

could

have only been an Pxpression arising from the contemplation that the defendant

\\~as

willing to purchase the

business for she then said, "Do you want me to call the
help and have them co1ne do\vn so that you can continue
to

run~''

(T. 655).

In considering the evidence of the existence of a conversion, it should be remembered that conversion is a
tort concerned with the possession of property. See 89
C.J.S., "Trover & ·Conversion," Sec. 3, page 533:
''Conversion is a tort, a \Vrongful act, \vhich
in the nature of things cannot spring from the
exercise of a legal right. The law of conversion,
it has been said, is concerned with possession, not
title, conversion being an offense against possession of property. It may be either direct or constructive, and may be proved directly or by
inference. The essence of conversion is not the
acquisition of property by the wrongdoer, but a
wrongful deprivation of it to the O\vner, although
a temporary deprivation will be sufficient; and
in consequence it is of no importance what subsequent application was made of the converted
property, or that defendant derived no benefit
from his act."
It is unimportant that on the morning of August 14,
1962, Peterson made no formal demand for the delivery

14
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to hint ot' thP ('quiptnent and inventory, ete. ~urh a denutnd \\'ottld haYP hPPn futile in viP\\' of the fact that
Platt had rPfUsPd PetP rson the p<'rishablPs ( T. 40), hi~
books ( rf' • .t-1) and H<'<'PSS to thP building for the making
of a tPlcphone call (T. 43). Tn addition, as noted, Platt
h'Hti fiPd on cross-Pxamination that had such a request
lH'Pn tnadt\ it 'vould have heen denied at that time (T.
6S(i-(}S7).

··A de1nand and refusal are not essential to a
eonYPrsion 'vhere it is clear that a demand would
ha VP hPPn uselL'ss or unavailing, if it had hPPn
made.'' See 89 C.J.S., "Trover & Conversion,''
HPc\ :>7, page 561.
XuniProus authorities are cited in support of the foregoing 8tatement.
rehe right of a conditional vendee to bring a suit for
the conversion of property has been considered. See the
annotation in 116 A.L.R. 904. A general statement of
thP principle is found in 89 C.J.S., "Trover & Conver~ion ... ~(\e. 164, page 643:
1

··.A. plaintiff having only a special or qualified
right or interest may recover the full value of the
converted property, as against a stranger having
neither title nor right of possession: but, as
against a defendant having an interest or right
in the property, recovery is limited to the value
of plaintiff's interest or right, and to the fair value
of the property."

15
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A conditional vendee rnay "'"ell be entitled to recover the
full value of the property converted rather than just the
value of his equity. The reason and basis for such recovery being :
~' ...

thP fact that the party having the limited
or qualified interest is liable over to the owner
of the remaining interest, and in order to be adequatPly compensated Inust receive sufficiPnt compensation not only to con1pensate himself for his
own loss but to satisfy thP de1nands of such
O\Yner." Goldberg v. List, 79 P.2d 1087 (Cal. 1938)
The case of So1dhern Arizona Bank & Trust Company v. Stigers, 53 P.2d 422 (Arizona, 1936), involved
the right of the conditional vendee to sue for the conversion of an automobile. In this case the court pern1itted
the recovery which amounted to the difference between
the balance of the car and what he owed on the purchase
price, but noted that circumstances might exist \vhere the
measure of the damage might be the full value of the
property:
'The legal title is not ahvays necessary to
an action for conversion, hut any special valuable
interest in the property accompanied \Yith the
right of possession is sufficient to for1n the basis
of such an action.' Carvell v. Weaver, 54 c·aL
App. 734, 202 P. 897, 898.
H

"Where the converter of the property is in
no way connected with its title, the buyer's measure of damages is the full value of the property.
Burnett v. Edw. J. Dunnigan, Inc., 165 Wash. 164,
4 P'.2d 829."
16
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l.t is apparent, th('reforf'. that insofar as the Pqnipln£'nt eovPrPd by the Conditional SalPs Contract is conePrne<l, PetPrson had an intPrPst that could he and \vas
converted.
rrhe case of Crutcher n. Scott Puh. Co., 253 P.2d D~;)
( \Yashington, 1!1:>:~), involved an action by a buyer's
t rusteP in bankruptcy against a seller's assignee for conversion of property. Suit was brought for the conversion
of property and destruction of a going business. ln regard to the right of one having a limited interest in
property to sue for conversion thereof, the court held:

"'Ve think respondent's point is well taken.
A person who is entitled to bring an action for a
conversion, although he has a limited interest in
the property converted, may, as against a stranger, recover the full value of the property. HadlPy
Warehouse Co. v. Broughton, 1923, 126 Wash.
356, 218 P. 257; Burnett v. Ed,v. J. Dunnigan, Inc.,
supra: Anstine v. McWilliams, 1945, 24 Wash. 2d
230, 162 P.2d 816; Angell v. Le,viston State Bank,
1925, 7~ ~font. 345, 232 P. 90; 53 Am. Jur. 907,
Trover and Conversion, Sec. 121.
ln Corey v. Struve, 1915, 170 Cal. 170, 149
P. 48, the Supreme Court of California said:
H

" 'The rule that the o\vners of a special interest in property may recover only to the extent
of such interest applies only to cases where the
17
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suit is brought against the owner of the remaining
interest or his assignee.' "
See also IJrirer 1; • .L1cquisto, 302 P.2d 387 (California,
1956).
Since In this case Peterson's obligation to Arctic
Circle, Inc., \vas cancelled, his recovery \Vas appropriately limited to his equity in the equipment covered by the
Conditional Sales Contract.
On page 27 of the defendant's brief counsPl, in support of his claim that there was no act of conversion on
the morning of August 14, 1962, claims that the defendant "had a contractual right under the lease to resume
possession if there \v·as a default in the payment of rent"
and the "defendant had a lien, pursuant to the lease, on
all property of every kind which the plaintiff owned or
had an ownership interest in, and \vhich was located in
the building (Exhibit 1)." This claim of counsel is 1nost
novel and is, of course, totally unsupported by any
authority. It is true that the defendant claimed to be
enforcing "Clause 8" of the lease in the lock-out and
take-over of the drive-in. Nothing in the defendant's
pleadings indicated, ho\vever, that the defendant \\Tas ever
seeking to enforce any lien right. Counsel made this
same feeble argument to the trial court. Judge Faux's
comments, \\'"hich unfortunately are not in the record of
the case, were a classic commentary on the forcible entry

18
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nn<l detainPr
\\'Pll

~tatnte~

estahli~hPd

of

in this

thi~

~tatP

and other

statP~.

It is so

as to requirP no com1nent

or eitation of authority, that one cannot forcibly enter
propPrty and

on~t

thP oeC'upants thPrPof. He 1nust resort

to thP orderly procedures established by la"T (see 'ChaptPr :~fi of Title 78, l Ttah Code Annotated, 1953) .
..:\~ for the claim that the defendant had a lien, sufficp it to state that none was ever pleaded or asserted,
nor "·a~ any effort ever made by the defendant to follow
tl1P proc.edure Ly ""hieh such a lien is to be perfected (see
Chapter 3 of TitlP 38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). In
any PVPnt, as already pointed out, the trial court found,
and justifiably so that on October 14, 1962, the plaintiff
had paid the current rental to August 23, 1962.
(E) The security arrangentent between Peterson
and . .·1 ref ic Circle.

Follo,ving the lockout, take-over and conversion by
Platt, Peterson contacted representatives of Arctic Circle
and consulted with Wilford M. Burton (T. 50). As a
re~ult of this consultation, documents were prepared by
'Yilford Burton \vhereby Peterson made an assignment
of all that he had in the drive-in to Arctic Circle for the
purpose of securing his open-account indebtedness to
. .\rctic Circle ( T. 56, 57, 151-153, 411, 430, 431). The
arrangement behveen Arctic ~Circle and P'eterson is evidenced by Exhibits 5 A, B, C.
19
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The trial court

revie"~ed

Exhibit 5 in detail and dis-

cussed the san1e at length with counsel at the trial of the
rase ('T. 6-l-69). Though no formal finding of fact or
conclusion of la'v was made by the trial court in regard
thereto, the court ruled (T. 67) that by Exhibit 5-A the
plain tiff sold certain chattels, merchandise, inventory
and equipment not covered by the conditional sales agreement to Arctic Circle, Inc. The trial court saw in Exhibit
5-B the background of the security arrangement (T. 68).
To the trial court the third instrument (E!xhibit 5-C)
indicated that all title and ownership of the property
covered thereby vested absolutely in Arctic Circle. Arctic
Circle thereafter settled its claim against Platt with the
understanding, however, that Platt would still have to
settle with Peterson (Exhibit 12). The court interpreted
Exhibit 5-D, the agreement of November 12, 1962, as an
agreement between the Petersons and Platt, by which the
Petersons were granted the right to proceed with the
suit as though the action between Arctic Circle and Platt
and the other elements and transactions had not intervened (T. 60).
The agreement of November 7, 19·62 (Exhibit 12),
the agreement of November 12, 1962 (Exhibit 5-D), and
particularly the stipulation of the defendant through his
attorney during the course of the trial (T. 453-456) are
all consistent and make it clear that the Petersons are
20
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properly pros(\enting the

action~

and are the real parties

in interPst. Arctic CirclP, having settled with Platt,

no\\~

<·laiJns nothing frotn hi1n (T. 383-385).
(F)

The cont'('rsion a.gainst Arctic Circle on the

afternoon of .A.-1-ugnst 1-t-, 1962.

The Pvidence further shows that at least by the afternoon of August 14, 1962, a conversion had been committed
n~ to .:\retie Cirele. By reason of the assignment to Arctic
Circle, the conditional vendor, it became entitled to the
possession of the equipment and property in the drive-in.
On that afternoon Ralph Edwards and Don Edwards of
..:\rctic Circle went with Peterson to the drive-in premises
(T. !10). They observed tha.t the building was locked and
Platt's camper backed up against the doorway (T. 50,
:ll). Platt was informed of the assignment to Arctic
Circle and demand \vas made on Platt by Ralph Edwards
of . :\rrtic Circle that the building be unlocked in order
that the inventory and equipment might be removed (T.
53). Platt flatly told them that "nobody is getting into
that building" ( T. 53). The conversion by this time, if
not in the morning of the same day, was certainly complete as to Arctic Circle, the conditional vendor of the
equipment and vendee of other property in the drive-in.
(G)

There 1cas no failure on the part of Peterson

to ignore or waive the conversion by Platt, and Platt's
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._. .·cttlenleut zcith Arctic Circle left standing Peterson's
case zcitlz all of its causes of action against Platt.

On page 29 of his brief counsel for the defendant
contends that even if Platt's conduct in locking the building and taking over on the morning of August 14th
a1nounted to a conversion of the plaintiff's property that
PetPrson's subsequent assignment to Arctic Circle extinguished any cause of action Peterson might have had.
Couns<>l for the appellant argues that Peterson still
clain1ed o\vnership and dominion over the property and
grasps at ''election of remedies," "estoppel" or "whatPVPr~' and claims that any cause of action Peterson might
have had \vas extinguished (page 30 of appellant's brief).
It is obviously true that Peterson could have made an
arrange1nent with Platt \\'"hereby the conversion might
have been disregarded, forgotten, or ignored. However,
there is not one iota of testimony to indicate that as
bet\veen Peterson and Platt there was any intention to
ignore, \vaive or disregard the conversion of Platt. On
the contrary the evidence is clear that Peterson and
. : \ rcti e Circle stood firmly on the conversion ( T. 50, 56,
37, 151. 153, 411, 430, Exhibit:>).

"l\y- e,

of course, have no quarrel \vith the general

statPlnent of the la\\'" as set forth in 89 C.J.S., "Trover &
Convursion,"

~88.

Such a general stat01nent, ho\\'"PYPr, only

hegs th0 question. The cases cited by counsel on page 30
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of the appellant's brit'f, ho\\·PvPr, arP Ritnply not in point.
.Johnston 1'. (Jiu('innati lf,11. ('n .. ~-lO S.,,r. -l-~9 (Tenn.
19:!:2), invoh·pd a fact situation having no eo1nparison to
the in~tant (lase. In that <·n~P, the plaintiff \vaived the
clnitn of <·onvPr~ion by allPging an O\\,.ner~hip of thP
propflrty and a~king for its return and for rental or hire
for its n~<'. .\~ a Blatter of fact, that election "·as 1nore
d(-.finitPI~·

PXPreisPd ,,·hen

short!~·

thereaftPr the receiver

fl<'<'Ppted bnc·k thP property from the defendant and pro<·PPded to dispose of it. Stout
190(i)

'l'.

IJ'ultz, 93

s.,,-r. 919

(~fo.

ng-ain involvns a eo1npletely dissimilar fact situa-

tion. In that easP, the plaintiff's cow got into the defendant'~

field ovPr a division fencP. The defendant looked

hPr up and refused to turn her out until the plaintiff
paid datnages, but after\\·ard 1nade settlement \\·ith plaintiff and turned the co\\· out on his "·ritten order. The
court held, of course, that the defendant \vas not liable
to thP plaintiff for the value of the cow. In W caldey v.
fJ'raus,

46 S.,,r. 1070 (Tenn. 1897) the court concluded

that there \\·as not even a conversion. It is true, ho\vever,
in TVeakley

l'.

Erans, supra, that the court did indicate

that if there had been a conversion involving the same, it
had been \\·aived by the dealings bet\veen the plaintiffs
and defendants, inasn1uch as the plaintiffs negotiated
,,·ith the defendants to sell them the goods involved and
at all times in their dealings with the defendant treated
the property as their own.
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As already pointed out in the instant case, there is
not one iota of evidence indicating that Peterson in his
dealings 'vith Platt ever intended to "'"aive the conversion. The assign1nent to Arctic Circle was for security
purposes only and 'vas simply to place Arctic Circle in a
position to like,vise de1nand the possession of the equipment and property.

The testi1nony of vVilford Burton makes it clear
that there 'vas no intention 'vhatsoever of waiving Platt's
conversion. His counsel and the action taken pursuant
thereto 'vere for the sole purpose of protecting both the
interests of Peterson and Arctic 'Circle ( T. 736-7 44).

It must be remembered that in the drive-in cafe
there 'vere inventory items and items of personal property belonging to Peterson and particularly the equipInent of 'vhich Peterson was the conditional vendee and
Arctic ;Circle the conditional vendor (Exhibits 6, 7). As
already sho,vn, the conduct of Platt "'"as such as to a1nount
to a conversion of the interests of both Peterson and
Arctic Circle. Exhibit No. 5, coupled "'"ith the testimony
of p·eterson (T. 56, 151, 153), Ralph Edwards (T. 411430), and Wilford Burton (T. 730-744), makes it clear
that th0 only intention of Peterson and Arctic Circle was
to preserve all causes of action against Platt, and at the
same tin1e give some security to Arctic Circle for the
open-account indebtedness of Peterson to that company.
24
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SuhsPquPntly, on . \.ugust :20, 1~)fi:2, t'vo actions were
filPd against Platt, one hy PetPr~on in thP instant case
and one hy Aretie Circle (T. 453, 453). Thereafter, on
XovPtnhPr 7, 1~)():2, Arctic Ci rele settled its clai1n against
Platt: nPvPrthPlP~s, with the Pxplicit provision that the
cnll~P of :H·tion of l)PtPrson would remain (Exhibit 12).
ThP XovPtllb(lr 7th HPttlenlPnt Agree1nent between the
defPndant Platt and Arctic CirclP expressly provided
that "all rights of Richard N. Peterson and 'vife pertaining to the aetion in the District Court on any settlement
eontraet "·ith Lo,vell Platt are unaffected."

()n KOYPtuber 12, 1962, the Petersons and P1att entPrPd into an agreement, whereby its was specifically
provided that a prior settlement agreement of October
~' 1f)(i:2, "·as rescinded as between the Petersons and
Platt hy reason of a breach on the part of Platt of that
agree1nen t.

Counsel for the defendant seems to want this court
to believ(} that there was some collusion and misdealing
,,·ith Platt as to 'vhose property and causes of action
,,·prp being dealt ""ith in the settlement with Arctic ~Circle
( spe page 35 of appellant's brief).

Counsel even chose to indulge in the facetious
analogy of ~~button, button, 'vhose got the button." Such
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a staten1ent is nothing but Inisleading to this court in
vie\\. of the ahove n1entioned agreements of November
7 and N" ovemb0r 12, 1962, to \vhich Platt was a party.
Particularl~v

is the court's attention invited to the
follo\ving language of the agreement of November 12,
1962 (Exhibit 5-D):
Platt does hert}h~· agreP that the S<'ttlement Agreement of October 8, 1962, is rescinded
as bet\veen the Petersons and Platt by reason of
the breach of Platt, and Arctic Circle, Inc., may
proceed to deal separately and settle its cause of
action \vith Piatt, in aid of \\'"hich the Pet0rsons
have executed and delivered a Subrogation (subordination) Agreement as far as the judgment
lien of the Petersons in Cause No. 138239, w·ith
the express understanding and agreement that as
between Action No. 138239 all parties interested
and concerned \vi th this action are restored to
their original position prior to the October 8, 1962
Settle1nent Agreement, and particularly said Action No. 128239 (138239) and all rights concerned
therewith are reserved and are unaffected and
available to the parties concernPd."
H •••

and particularly is the court's attention invited to the
express stipulation of counsel ( T. 453-456) :
''MR HANSEN: We will stipulate, further,
he was aware of t\vo causes of action.

*

*

*

"MR. HANSEN: We will stipulate that he
knew that there was a cause of action from the
Petersons toward himself, and there was a second

26
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rausP of action fron1 ;\ r<'tie Ci rele to hintsPlf.

Hrrl I]~ C( )1 TRT: I don't think that 'vould
satisfy ~lr. ~fr~lurrny. ThPy have t'vo causes of
action.
"~IR.

HANSEN: Oh- well, you mean two
enuses of action within this lawsuit. We will so
stipulate; I thought they meant two different lawsuits.
'Yill stipulatP he knew there \YPrP t,,.o
different la,vsuits, one from Peterson and Arctic.
~~we

~·Further

stipulate, he knew there were two
causes of action in the lawsuit before the court.
HTHE COURT: The court will accept that
stipulation and as to those two matters; so, you
have in the record, now, stipulation that he kne"\\r
there \Vere two lawsuits, and, in this Peterson
la\Ysuit, he kne"\v there were two separate causes
of action.
''MR. McMURRAY: Well, there were more
than two separate causes of action.

"I take it, it would be all the causes of action
recited in each of the lawsuits.
•'He would know that, and was put on notice
of that. !(new about it at the time he filed his
Ia,vsuit.
'~THE

COURT:

He has stipulated to that.

~fR.

l\Icl\Il"'"RRAY : He says two causes of
action; we have three in this lawsuit.
h
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"~IR.

HANSEN: I \vill stipulate Mr. Platt
was vv-ell aware - had full knowledge - his head
\\Tas bulging \vith facts pertaining to court records.
-'THE COTTRT: All right. It \vas the court's
error~ stipulate he knew there were four causes
of action.

'" ~rR. HANSEN : We 'vill stipulate he knew
of both la\vsuits and all causes of action included
in them.
'~'THE

COURT: All right; you have that
stipulation. The court recognizes that stipulation.
You may go from there."
Befor~ ~igning

the agreement of K ovember 7, 1962,
Don Ed\\Tards told Platt "it \Vould have to be clearly
understoofl, to protect Arctic Circle, Inc., that our settlelnPnt of aetion \vith Mr. Platt did not relieve him of any
responsibility of the action that him and ~fr. PetPrson
had pending; that ''Te had to have this - I had to protect
Arctic ~Circle, Inc., both from ~lr. Platt and also ~Ir.
Peterson" (T. 299-300). The defendant stated that he
had no objection whatsoever to signing the agreement
(T. 300).
Thus not only \vas the defendant a\vare of the plaintiff's case and all causes of action contained therein, but
hP agreed that such \vould remain ( T. -+53-456). These
\vnre the very causes of action pursuant to \vhich the trial
court gave Peterson judgment. How can the defendant
no\\T in good conscience complain that there \Vas something that he didn't kno\\' about the arrangement J?
28
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\\'hat the rlofendant i>Jatt is aetually doing is resorting to n t.-ehnieal and sp(~eious argument to keep fro1n
pn~·ing P<'terson for t hP property he had converted. The
inPqnity of I>Iatt's position is at once apparent. Platt
ntadP a settlement \vith Arctic Circle as the conditional
vPndor of the equip1nent (Exhibit 12). Having satisfied
t hP eIa i tn of the conditional vendor, Platt, by the argutnent he has resorted to, is now seeking to avoid payment
to the r.onditional vendee. In other words, Platt, having
convPrtPd the equip1nent, inventory and other property,
and having satisfiPd the claim of the conditional vendor,
no\\· SPPks to leave Peterson Hstanding out in the cold"
"~ithout anything. In short, the defendant is arguing that
he should no'v have thP equipment covered by the conditional sale contract for si1nply the value of the vendor's
interest therein. He 'vould thus take over Peterson's
business and even deprive him of his equity in the equipnlent. The same malicious attitude that prompted the
defendant to lock the plaintiff out of the business now
pron1pts hiln to seek, 'vithout compensation, to even
depriYP Peterson of his equity and interest in the equiptnent, inventory and property.

The justness of the judgment of the trial court is
made even more significant "Then it is remembered that
the defendant has such a little respect for the law that
he considers it "90 per cent bluff" ( T. 383).
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On pages 30 and 31 of the defendant's brief, counsel
states that '"Arctic never purported to make any reassignment or re-conveyance to plaintiff" and that the
agreement between the plaintiff and defendant ''restored
them to their respective legal positions as of October 8,
19,62 (Exhibit 5-D) ." This, of course, is completely erroneous. Implicit in the agreements of November 7 and
November 12, 1962 (Exhibits 12 and 5-D) is a re-assignInent to the plaintiff, and the parties by the agreement
of November 12, 19'62 (Exhibit 5-D) were not restored to
their respective legal positions as of October 8, 1962, but
\Yere restored to their "original position prior to . . .
October 8, 1962 ... ," and it \vas particularly agreed that
the action of the plaintiffs ''and all rights concerned
therewith are reserved and are unaffected and available
to the parties concerned."
l\Ir. Hansen's examination of ''Tilford Burton referred to on page 33 of the defendant's brief is cited by
counsel in an apparent effort to have the court believe
that there was some secret plan and arrangement between
the Petersons and Arctic Circle. Not one iota of evidence
\Vas produced by the defendant, during a trial that lasted
several days, to support such a contention. The questions
propounded to l\Ir. Burton, to \vhich objection \vas made
and sustained by the court, \vere manifestly objectionable
for lack of any materiality and as an apparent attempt
to go behind the written documents and prolong the
trial, which, as it was, took nearly a \veek.
30
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POINT NO. II
TIIE AWARD OF DAl\IAGES FOR MENTAL ANGUISH
AND SUFFERING AND TIIE AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAl\IAGES WERE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDFNCE.

Findi11gs of l~,aet Xos. ~) and 13 arP supported hy
suhstant1nl PvidPtH·e and support the conclusion of the
trial eourt that the plaintiff should have judg1nent hy
rPason of 1nental anguish and suffering ($10.00), as
,,.Pll as an a\\·ard for punitive damages ($1,000.00) (R.
90, Dl). The rerord is clPar that the defendant's attit\Hh~ and eonduct in locking Peterson out of the drive-in
and taking the sa1ne over was defiant, high-handed and
uneonst ·ionable ( T. 39-45, 80-81, 296-297).
In 17 ..t~.L.R.~d 936 is found an annotation dealing
,,·ith the precise subject: "Recovery By Tenant Of DrunagPs Is Suffieient Injury Or ~{ental Anguish Occasioned
By 'Vrongful Eviction." On page 938 of the annotation,
thP annotator notes the following:
HEven though there is no allegation of physical injury, and a claim is made for damages due
to mental anguish or humiliation alone, the courts
generally permit the tenant to recover.
"It has been held that the landlord is liable
in damages for the mental suffering occasioned
by the 'vrongful eviction, especially where the
circumstances surrounding the eviction are such
that it may be regarded as malicious, or constituting a reckless disregard of the sensibilities
of the tenant."
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1n ~npport of this stat(~l!Ient tl1P annotator cites various
deei~ion~ fro1n variou~ jurisdictions including a decision
of the SnpreinP Court of the State of lTtah in Hargrave
p·• ....') 0~' S
r . I ~ e 1.g 71 • ' ., l-~t a h 1-u
' \:1 , ....~)-3
'
~ •
-q

Peterson's testi1nony as to th<> mental anguish, huIniliation, embarrassment and anxi(•ty suffered by him
i ~ uncontested and is certainly sufficient to justify an
a\Yard for such ('T. 506-507) .

.As for punitive damages, the observation of the
Supreme 'Court of the State of ~California in San l?ranrisro & Sulnt1·ban H 0111e Btttilding Society v. Leonard,
110 P. 405, -l-11, is right in point:

"It \Yas not necessary in our opinion for the
plaintiff to plead more than the alleged forcible
detainer to entitle it to prove facts \vhich \Vould
have justified the court in a":arding exe1nplary
or punitive damages. The charge of forcible detainer of real property necessarily carries with
it the implication that such detainer is from a
bad motive, and \Yhat the precise nature of that
n1otive is - \Yhether it be founded in malice or
fraud or oppression of any sort - 1nay properly
be sho,vn under the general averment that the
detainer is forcible. It 1nay be that the defendant
in such a case can sho\Y that the force used was
only In furtherance of the maintenance of his
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rights: yPt, thP ~tatute having ~aid that surh
<lPtainPr is in violation of la\\", thP merP charging
of th<· act presupposp~ thP exi~teneP th~rein of all
thP f~letnPn t ~ Pssent ial to thP consum1nation of
the ehargP as it is defined by the statutP, and
"·llf~ther, as a n1atter of fact, Plements justifying
the imposition of punitive damages are present in
the net n1nst, of course, dPpPnd upon 'vhat thP
proof discloses."
Punitive dan1agP~ havP frequently hPPn a\\·arded
incident to conditions of ronvPrsions. Kumerons casPs
arP eitP<l in the annotation appearing in :J-l- A.L.R. 2d,
1sn~. ..\<lditional eases arP noted in 101 .L\.L.R. at page
+SO. In this annotation, the annotator considers thP
tnattnr of dispos~H·ssion \vithout legal process hy one
Pntitled to po~~P~~ion of real property as gronnd of netion, other than for rPeovPry of possession or da1nage
to hi~ per~on, h~· pPr~on disposP~sPd. On page 480 the
annotator ~tates the follo\ving:

.. The humiliation suffered by the occupant of
pren1isPs through his forcible dispossession without legal process hy one entitled to possession is
occasionally considered grounds for recovery of
damages."
Particularly are rasPs noted beginning "~ith page 1388
of the annotation in point. The evidence on this part
support the finding that Platt \Yas guilty of an overt act
in evicting Peterson and in converting the property. The
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n1alicious, high-handed attitudP of Platt was clearly
Pvidenced on the 1norning of 1\ugust 1-l, 196~, when Peterson pleaded \vith him to get the business open for business that day (T. 36-45). To this plea Platt officiously
and defiantly stated that no one was going in the building ( T. 40-45). There ""as no justification for the termination of the business in the abrupt manner employed
by Platt. HP had available to him all of the legal processes by ""hich he could attempt to terminate the lease
and regain possession of the property. He had available
to him legal eounsel with \Vhom he could consult.
Instead of resorting to a peaceful, amicable approach
to this problem, the testi1nony of Peterson (T. 38-45)
and Ed\Yards (T. 294) give substantial support to Finding X o. 9 of the trial court ( R. 90) that:
" ... the conduct of the defendant, Platt, was
overt, uncalled for, colored with malice and
amounted to an unlawful termination of the Lease
and conversion of Peterson's property \Yithin the
premises."
The a\vard of damages for mental anguish and the
a\va.rd of punitive damages should stand.
POINT NO. III
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES WAS PROPER
AND SUPPORTED THE AWARD MADE BY THE TRIAL
COURT.
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In connt-rtion 'vith this issue the trial court In
Findings of Fact Nos. 10 and 11 found as follo,vs:
"10. At the timP of the lockout and takeover by the defendant, J. Lo,vell Platt, the following iteins and property were 'vithin the
premises, all of which 'vere converted by the defendant, Platt :

" (a) Equipment being purchased by the
Petersons from Arctic Circle, Inc. under a
conditional sales contract (Exhibit No. 6, p.
1), the value of Peterson's equity converted
being $8,527.74.
"(b) Equipment (Exhibit No.7, page 1)
not covered by the conditional sales contract
(\ralue: $2,366.19) less the amount of the
Marvion Sign Obligation ($1,712.00) . . . . .
. . . . . . $654.19.
" (c) Other items of personal property
(Exhibit No. 7, page 2), having a value of
$1,644.63.
" (d) Inventory (Exhibit No. 7), having
a value of $1,632.00."
"11. The equipment covered by the aforesaid
Conditional Sales Contract, Exhibit No. 6, which
equipment was being purchased by the Petersons
from Arctic ~Circle, Inc., was a special type of
equipment manufactured for the particular type
of business operated by plaintiffs. The equipment
was of a peculiar and special nature and had no
ready market value, and as a practical matter
could only be replaced by the purchase of new
equipment."
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In rPgard to the nature and value of the equipment
converted ' the unrefuted testin1o11Y
. of PPterson and
l~alph }~d,,,.ards "Tas to the effect that the Pquipment
\\Ta~ of a ~p(•cia1 typP peeuliar to the plaintiff's bu~iness;
that n1uch of thP Pquip1nent had lH\Pn 1nanufactun·d Pspeciall~T for the plaintiff's business; that it ,,·ns practically
ne\v: that it di\l not haYP a rPad~T 1narkPt Yalue; that its
aetual1na rkut value \\·ould lH· far bPlo\\· its I' Pal or intrinsie valu(': and that thP equipn1ent could only hP rPplaeed
hy the pure hase of ne"r equipn1ent ( T. 1~4, 304-308, ::-~30,
374).
ln this connection the courfs attention is invited
to the annotation in 1 ~ A.L.It 2d at page 902 entitled
'" :,\Iea~ure of Da1nages For Conversion Or Loss Of, Or
Damage To, Personal Property Having No ~Iarket Y'" alue." ~:\ sunnnary of the general rule is stated in 89 C.J.S.,
""Trover & Conversion," Sec. 165, page 643:
Generally, if the property has such a value,
the value to be taken is its fair market value,
rather than the price paid for the property by
plaintiff, a price lo\ver than the market value
at \Vhich the plaintiff could purchase property of
like species, quantity, and quality, under a contract he has with a third person, the price at
which it \vas sold, or contracted to be sold, the
fair retail price of the property, the 'reasonable
value' of the property, the par value, or its fair
value to the owner. If the property has littlP or
no market value, and is of a special or higher
nalue to plaintiff, the value to be taken as the
measure of recovery is the actual and fair val1te
to plaintiff, provided it is not nzcrrly fanciful or
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sen.tintt'ntal. JJ"hcrl' thcrt' is no ntarkct valul' for
the goods in controrersy. other standards. inc!~td
inq lht· rcphtt('IIU'IIl rallfl', ntay br 'Used to deterlnine the ralue of fhf' goods. Jloreorcr, the nHtrknt rallll' ll'ill1U'i'('r be adhered to as the absolllfc
nu'asn re of recovcT.IJ trhere to do so 1rould be (t
departurf' front the ntore {undrnnental principll'
of j u.st co 111 }Jl' u sat ion for the in.iury or loss sustained by rt'ason of the conversion.'' (J~:rnphasis
ours)
X unteron~ ra~Ps are eitP<l by· the annotator holding
that \YhPn propPrty ~ueh as \\~as convertPd hy Platt is
inYolYPd. propPr ~len1cnts to consider in determining the
atnount or drunagPs are tlu~ follo\\~ing: value to the o\\~n
er, original cost, rPproduction or replacernent costs, t}tc.
ThP annotator further points out that a deduction for
deprPeiation is proper.

Both PPtPrson and Ralph Edwards testified that
the Yalue of the equipment in the drive-in 'vas determined
hy taking thP original cost and allo\ving an appropriate
dPprt'eiation ba~ed on the anticipated "life" of the property (T. 117, 1:2~, 1~:-~, 30-t, 306, 3:21-322). The authorities
eited by tlH~ annotator in thP aboYP mentioned annotation
clearly ~upport the proposition that for the kind of
equiprnen t involved, the cost less depreciation method
follo\\~ed by the plaintiffs and those 'vho testified on
his behalf 'vas entirely propPr.
The testimony of Ralph Ed,vards and Peterson in
regard to the value of the equipment covered by the
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Conditional Sales ·Contract and other property items
was as set forth on Exhibit No. 7 (see also T. 117-129).
The testimony of Peterson alone was sufficient to
support the finding of the trial court as to the value of
the equipment and property converted and the amount of
Peterson's claim (R. 90-91; T. 117, 118, 133, 138, 139-142).
There can be no question that both the plaintiff and
Ralph Ed·w·ards were competent to testify as to the value
of the equipment and property converted by the defendant (T. 113-116, 118-119, 132).
'\rP further invite the court's attention to the fact
that insofar as damages are concerned and the value of
the equipment, the defendant offered not one iota of
evidence to rebute the testimony proffered by the plaintiffs in this regard.
POINT NO. IV
'VHEN THE DEFENDANT PLATT, BROKE THE LEASE
ON AUGUST 14, 1962, THE RENT WAS ACTUALLY PAID TO
AUGUST 23, 1962 AND PETERSON BECAME ENTITLED TO
CREDIT FOR TWO MONTHS ADVANCE RENTAL. ACCORDINGLY, THERE WAS NO DELINQUENT RENTAL
OWING TO PLATT FOR WHICH PLATT WAS ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT.

As pointed out under Point No. I, substantial evidence was presented from which the trial court could
find, as it did, that the commencement of the monthly
rental period was changed from the lOth day of each
month to the 23rd day of each month; and as already
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pointed out under Point No. I, on the 1norning of August
14, 19ti2, the date of the lock-out, Peterson's rent \vas
netually paid to August 23, 1962, though one-half of thP
rPnt for December, 1961, and January, 1962, and the
full a1nount of rent for April, 1962 was unpaid (Exhibit
~, T. 17-30).
'Ph u~, on August 14, 1962, the rent \Vas actually paid
until ~\ugust 23, 1962, though one-half of the rent for
Det•.ember, 1961 and January, 1962, and the full amount
of rent for April, 1962, was unpaid. However, as already
noted, Platt, on June 10, 1960 had already received two
ntontl1s' rent ($1,250.00) in advance. (See Check No. 1,
~~xhibit

1.)

No,v, \Vhen Platt evicted Peterson on the 14th day
of 1\ugust, he thereby terminated the lease.
"On the other hand, it is the well-settled general rule that where the eviction by a landlord
is of the whole premises, this will relieve the tenant from liability for future accruing rents. Suceinctly stated, the eviction suspends the rent during the period of the eviction. This rule results
from the meaning of the term 'rent,' and from
" the obligations between landlord and tenant.
Rent is compensation for the use of land, and
what the tenant pays rent for is quiet possession
or beneficial enjoyment. When, therefore, the use
or possession ceases by reason of an act of the
landlord, the consideration for the payment ceases
or fails." 32 Am. Jur., "Landlord and Tenant,"
Sec. 478, p. 391.

Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 172
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X.E. 3;), 37:
~'The

eviction of a tenant fron1 thP possession
or enjoy1nent of the demised premises, or any
part thereof, by the landlord releases thP tenant
from the further payn1ent of rent. Rent is the
return made to the lessor hy the lesseP for his
use of the land, and thP landlord's claim for rent
therefore depends upon the tenant's enjoyment
of thP land for the term of his contract. It follo\YS that if thP tenant is deprived of the premises
hy any agency of the landlord the obligation to
pay rent ceases, because such obligation has force
only fron1 the consideration of the enjoyment of
the premises. The eviction which will discharge
the liability of the tenant to pay rent is not necPssarily an actual physical expulsion from the
premises or some part of them, but any act of the
landlord which renders the leasP unavailing to the
tenant or deprives him of the beneficial enjoyInent of the prPinises constitutes a constructive
eviction of the tenant, \vhich exonerates him from
the terms and conditions of the lease and he may
abandon it. Taylor on Landlord and Tenant, Sees.
379, 380; Halligan v. Wade, 21 Ill. 470, 74 Am.
Dec. 108; Anderson v. Chicago ~farine & Fire
Ins. Co., 21 Ill. 601; L·eadbeater v. Roth, 25 Ill.
587; Bentley v. Sill, 35 Ill. -!1± ~ Wright v. Lattich,
38 Ill. 293; Smith v. Wise & ·Co., 58 Ill. 141; Hayner v. Smith, 63 Ill. 430, 1-t- Am. Rep. 12-!."
l~ pon

the termination of the lease by reason of the
PYietion, Peterson \Vas entitled to credit for the two
1nonth~ advance~ rental \vhich equaled the t\vo 1nonths
rental that had hePn missed.
Wher0 a tenant has been \Vrongfully evicted:

40

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

''In a ntunber of <·asPs, it has been held that

\vherP thP n'nt has hePn paid in advance, the
tonant tnay recover back the rent paid, or at least
a proportionate part thereof." 32 Am. J ur.,
··r.jandlord and Tt'nant, '' Sec. 268, page 250. SPP
also 52 L .,f.S., ''Landlord and Tenant," Ser. rl-l-:l,
page 355.
1

Plutt, in unla\\·fully PYieting the PPtPrsons fron1 the
prPtnist~s bPforP th(\ Pxpiration of the rental p<'riod fro1n
.July :.!:~. 19(}~ to ~\ ngust ~~' l~)(i~, "·aR entitled to no n'nt
for that pPriod and, therPforP, the PPtersons had a valid
elaitn to rPeovPr against Platt the n1onth's rental from
,July ~:3, l9(i~ to August ~:2, 1962 in thP amount of $G:25.
~l'P 52 c.,J.S., •'Landlord and Tenant," Sec. 531, page
:~-l~:

"At comn1on la\v, and in the absence of statutP other\Yl8P providing, rent is not apportionable
in respect of ti1ne, and the O\vner of the premises
at the ti1ne of accrual is entitled to the rent for
the entire period, unless the lease expressly provide~ that there shall be apportionment. Th1ts a
landlord who is responsible for termination of the
tenancy betzveen rent days will not be entitled to
any part of the rent for that period; ... " (Emphasis added)
~Pe

also Jloskozc v. Fine, 198 X.E. 150 (j\fass., 1935):
··It \Vas said in Highland Trust Co. v. Slotnick C~Iass.) 193 N.E. 831, 832: 'The entry by the
mortgagee under a title paramount to that of the
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landlord with the demand that the tenant thereafter pay rent to the mortgagee was, in its effect
upon the tenant's liability under the lease to pay
rent to the landlord, equivalent to an eviction and
terminated the tenancy created by the lease. International Paper Co. v. Priscilla Co., 281 Mass.
22, 29, 34, 183 N.E. 58, and cases cited; Smith v.
Shepard, 15 Pick. 147, 25 Am. D·ec. 432. The rent
payable monthly in advance under the lease was
indivisible and not subject to apportionment and
the termination of the lease put an end to the
right which the landlord, prior to the entry, had
under the terms of the lease to require the payment of rent for the month of April. Smith v.
Shepard, supra; Fillebrown v. Hoar, 124 Mass.
580, 583; Sutton v. Goodman, 194 Mass. 389, 395,
80 N.E. ~608; Hall v. Middleby, 197 Mass. 485, 489,
83 N.E. 1114. See also, Hammond v. Thompson,
168 Mass. 531, 47 N.E. 137; Caruso v. Shelit, 282
Mass. 196, 199, 184 N.E. 460; Welch v. Gordon,
284 Mass. 485, 188 N.E. 239'"
See also Gorin v. Stroum, 192 N.E. 90, 93 (Mass. 1934).
Consistent with the foregoing the plaintiffs contended at the conclusion of the trial that they were entitled
to recover against Platt a month's rental from July 23,
1962 to August 22, 19·62 in the amount of $625. The trial
court, neverthele-ss, chose to apportion the rental and
only allowed the plaintiffs the sum of $181.48, the same
being the prorated portion of the rental from August
14, 1962 to August 23, 1962. Plaintiffs, however, have
not chosen to cross-appeal on this matter and have contented themselves "'"ith the a'Yard of $181,48.
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S{J~I~fAitY

In summary, the plaintiffs contend that the Findings of Fact of the trial court finds substantial evidence
in Uu.' record and the Conclusions of Law made and judgment enterPd should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
McKAY AND BURTON
and
MACOY A. McMURRAY

By1if.!:!~t!~~-~--~-~~~
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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